TESTIMONY OF MARIE-ANDRÉE BERTRAND before the

TESTIMONY OF MARIE-ANDRÉE BERTRAND

before the

SENATE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON ILLEGAL DRUGS

(Nolin Committee)

Ottawa

September 25, 2000

Bertrand, September 25, 2000

Testimony before the Senate Special Committee on Illegal Drugs

Status of the Issue

The initiative taken by one member of the Senate to recommend that a committee be struck to review Canada’s drug policy is definitely cause for celebration. The Senate must be congratulated for consenting to act on this proposal, and it is to be hoped that the committee will soon be given the necessary resources to carry out its mandate. Thirty years after the LeDain Report, this review was necessary, and the Riley Report, Drugs and Drug Policy in Canada: A Brief Review and Commentary (May 1999), was already a step in the right direction.

Canada is not the only country where this updating has proven necessary. In 1998, France’s Secretary of State for Health asked the Interdepartmental Committee on Drugs and Substance Abuse to conduct a review of this type, which resulted in a report entitled Problèmes posés par la dangérosité des « drogues ». Rapport du Professeur Bernard Roques au Secrétaire d’État à la Santé [Problems of Dangerous Drugs: Prof. Bernard Roques’ Report to the Secretary of State for Health] (May 1998, 189 pp.). As mandated, the Roques Report addressed not only the properties of psychoactive substances, their alleged harmfulness and therapeutic effects, but also the relationship between drugs and criminality and treatment for persons who become dependent on them.

Other European countries are also engaged in this type of review, either at the request of national authorities or under pressure from Europe’s Parliament. In England, Lord Walton, an eminent pharmacologist, was asked in 1998 "to study the properties of cannabis and the legal treatment of its use" (in Roques, 1998, Introduction). In many countries of the European Union, "commissions composed of psychiatrists, psychologists, legal experts and users" are meeting to "study the therapeutic effects of cannabis, the disputed dependence on that drug and the consequences of prohibiting its use" (in Roques, Introduction). And in Australia, commissions of inquiry and expert committees recently (1994 and 1998) reviewed that country’s policy on drugs in general and on cannabis in particular.

In addition, a number of recent scientific publications attest to the renewed interest of academics and researchers in the issue of drugs and thus to the current relevance of your mandate. I am thinking in particular of articles and reports published in 1998 and 1999 outlining the current state of knowledge in criminology, law, legal psychology, political science and social action on this issue in France, Italy, the Netherlands, Germany, Belgium and Switzerland.

Relevance of Your Mandate

Your inquiry thus stems from a need, expressed simultaneously in a number of circles, for an updating of knowledge on drugs and a comprehensive review of criminal and health policies. The April 12 press release issued by the Chairman of your Committee, Senator Nolin, states that your task will be not only to take a comprehensive look at psychotropic substances and their effects, but also, in light of those studies, to "reassess Canada’s strategy on illegal drugs" and that, to that end, you will consult the Canadian public, experts and interest groups and consider solutions developed and implemented in other countries.

The development of a national drug strategy over the next three years is a task of major importance and I envy you being able to take advantage of the experience of those who went before you. Although the current context differs from the political and scientific climate that prevailed at the time of the federal commissions of inquiry in the 1970s and 1980s, it is useful to note here the findings that those commissions brought to the attention of their respective parliaments and the fate reserved for their recommendations.

As I took part in the work of the Canadian Commission Inquiry into Non-Medical Drug Use for four years and witnessed the proceedings of other federal commissions on the same subject in the 1970s and 1980s, then, in the late 1980s, presided over an international drug policy organization, I would first like to share those experiences with you, then review the work that has been done on the question in recent years and, lastly, provide you with recent criminological information on the Canadian situation.

Knowledge and Recommendations Which Legislators Have Not Considered

The history of commissions of inquiry into drugs began in 1893 with the royal commission established by the Government of India into Indian hemp. In the years that followed, no fewer than 20 task forces were established by the governments of at least 10 countries to study cannabis and all psychotropic substances, their alleged effects and ways of controlling their use and trade.

Two facts emerge from the reports of these commissions and committees: first, the virtual unanimity of their findings on cannabis and, second, the almost unanimous refusal of legislatures to act on the commissions’ recommendations, except in the Netherlands.

Cannabis

From 1893 to 1896, the Indian Hemp Drugs Commission, which was established to determine the harmful effects of cannabis, produced one of the most comprehensive reports imaginable on the question. Its authors concluded that "the moderate use of cannabis produces no injurious effects on the mind" (264) and that excessive use was exceptional in the particular context of India at the time, even though the drug was popular and deemed culturally acceptable in certain social classes in that country. Having considered the assumption that cannabis had criminogenic effects, the Commission found, "For all practical purposes, it may be laid down that there is little or no connection between the use of hemp drugs and crime." (264)

Fifty years later, in 1944, Mayor La Guardia of New York struck a committee to examine the effects of cannabis on intellectual function. The studies conducted invalidated a number of the U.S. government’s claims in this respect. The La Guardia Committee studied 48 regular cannabis users living in New York City and concluded, "There is definite evidence in this study that the marijuana users were not inferior in intelligence to the general population and that they had suffered no mental or physical deterioration as a result of their use of the drug." After reviewing the criminogenic nature of the substance, the committee concluded that cannabis users had no aggressive tendencies.

Twenty years later, in 1967, a Presidential Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice was mandated to study drugs and their criminogenic effects in the United States. It recommended placing cannabis in a class separate from that of opiates, which induce drug dependence, which is not the case of cannabis.

At virtually the same time, in 1968, the British government commissioned a report from the Advisory Committee on Drug Dependence. The Committee’s report recommended that cannabis be removed from the list of opiates, that cannabis possession no longer be punished by imprisonment and that the drug be made available in pharmacies. Having reviewed the effects of cannabis on behaviour and criminality, the Committee concluded, "There is no evidence that taking cannabis in any special way stimulates behaviour of this kind." ( 30)

That same year (1968), in Holland, a first committee chaired by Louk Hulsman, then, in 1972, the Baan Committee produced similar reports which subsequently constituted the Netherlands’ official policy on the matter. Holland is the only country where this fate has been reserved for expert opinion. The authors recommended that the drug issue remain under the authority of the Minister of Health, as was traditionally the case in the country, and proposed that drugs be divided into two classes, soft drugs and hard drugs. The use and possession of the former were not to be subject to criminal control, which was mainly reserved mainly for trafficking in hard drugs. The general orientation of the reports was determined mainly by health rather than control concerns. As a consequence of this orientation, the Dutch policy is to disseminate consumer information on the quality of products available in the illegal market and to provide substance abusers with health services and substances most likely to enable them to avoid criminal dealers as well as places to use drugs. Not only did the Dutch Parliament accept the Baan Committee’s report in 1972, but, when it adopted the report, certain ministers, including the Minister of Justice, found it conservative.

That same year (1972), the U.S. government mandated a Presidential Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse, the Shafer Commission, to report on marijuana in particular. The Commission recommended that cannabis no longer be classified as a "narcotic", that possession for personal use and distribution in small quantities for no consideration be no longer criminalized under federal law and that possession no longer be illegal under U.S. criminal law. In the Commission’s view, "considering the range of social concerns in contemporary America, marihuana does not, in our considered judgment, rank very high." (167).

In Canada, in 1972, the LeDain Commission, following the most exhaustive review that had ever been conducted of cannabis, found that the probable and possible effects of cannabis did not justify the criminal policies applied to the substance and that the costs of drug prohibition were too high in view of the substance’s known effects. The majority report thus recommended decriminalizing simple cannabis possession and cultivation for personal purposes, removing cannabis from the list of narcotics and classifying it under the Food and Drugs Act and, using argument and statistics, rebutted the theories suggesting a progression in use from soft drugs to hard drugs and the criminogenic nature of the drug. One year later, in its final report, having completed experimental studies on human subjects who had been asked to consume large amounts of cannabis, the Commission was in a position to state that the use of this drug caused few acute physiological effects.

In 1979, the Government of Australia commissioned a study on "The Non-Medical Use of Drugs - South Australia". The Commission came to two conclusions concerning cannabis consistent with those of the LeDain Commission: that it should be decriminalized or subject to a "partial prohibition" under which possession and cultivation for personal purposes would cease to be criminal offences, whereas trafficking would remain such an offence. In addition, going beyond LeDain, it proposed adopting a "regulatory" model under which the cultivation and sale of cannabis would come under government control. The Australian report concluded that cannabis creates no drug dependence (96) and, based on the drug’s potential therapeutic effects, that it was effective in the treatment of glaucoma, and that THC may impede the development of certain types of cancer (116). The Australian report thus recommended amending the policy of total prohibition of cannabis. It is true, however, that subsequent reports (national committee and expert report, in 1994 in particular) expressed reserved positions and recommended that studies be conducted on the long-term effects of regular, extensive cannabis use.

Other Drugs

The national reports concur on four points concerning drugs other than cannabis and recommend that:

(1) psychotropic substances be reclassified on the basis of their properties and known effects;

(2) possession and use be abolished as Criminal Code offences. In Canada, the LeDain Commission’s interim (1970) and final reports (1973) considered the possibility of eliminating the offence of possession of any illegal drugs but did not specifically say so, concluding, "No one should be liable to imprisonment for simple possession of a psychotropic drug for non-medical purposes." (242, Interim Report) The maximum sentence should be a fine of $100, and judges should use their judicial discretion and strive to minimize the effects of criminal law in cases of possession of any psychotropic drug;

(3) restrictions on the medical use of opiates be repealed. These constraints have come under severe criticism in Great Britain where heroin treatment for drug addicts has never been completely prohibited;

(4) that criminal penalties for drug addicts be replaced by medical treatment.

Governments’ Reluctance to Act on the Reports They Have Commissioned

The recommendations made by the committees which governments have struck have been disregarded or rejected outright in all countries except the Netherlands.

Why have legislators refused to consider the opinions they have sought? How can we understand the astounding growth in international criminal legislation on the drug issue? Between 1910 and 1988, the dates of the first and last international conventions, the number of controlled substances increased from approximately 10 to 200 prohibited drugs (United Nations, 1983 and 1988). This was accompanied by a shift from control over production, then distribution of opium at the turn of the century to prohibition with the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs in 1961, that is to say to the prohibition of "holding" narcotics, which some countries have interpreted as applying to use. There was also an increase in the number of organizations responsible for controlling drug production and subsequently international trade to hundreds of thousands of public servants, thousands of councils, national and international commissions and sub-commissions as well as national and global police enforcement agencies. Any group such as yours intending to review national and international arrangements respecting drugs must deal with this powerful array of forces.

How can the fact that the more advanced countries have not yet agreed to seriously review their criminal legislation and classification of drugs on the basis of recent advances in knowledge be explained? The timid arrangement provided for by Canada’s new Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (1996) pales by comparison with the reclassifications previously proposed by the LeDain Commission in 1970 and 1973. How can the officials of dangerous drug bureaux be authorized to amend the list of prohibited drugs without Parliament’s involvement?

Furthermore, why have we had to fight so hard for a review of the restrictions on the medical use of opiates in the treatment of drug addicts? Are drugs the property of the state? Why are controls over the medical use of opiates so strict and rigid?

A number of analysts believe that the answer to these questions lies to a large extent in the international undertakings that the Parliaments of most known countries have signed. Therein lies the explanation of the rejection of all coherent and liberal proposals. In principle, however, parties signed the international conventions only after reaching agreements and in accordance with national jurisdictions. It is true that the attendant debates were often dominated by a few more powerful countries, but the number of amendments and exceptions demanded by the signatory countries to the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961), the Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1971), the Convention of 1972 on Narcotic Drugs Amending the Convention of 1961 and, lastly, the Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1988 (Vienna Convention), particularly by the poppy- and coca-producing countries, attest to the vigorous nature of the debates concerned. The number of signatories to these international agreements is constantly increasing. The prohibitionist model established by the 1961 Convention, which prohibits the holding of opiates, was confirmed in 1972, and controls were extended to include hallucinogenic drugs in 1971, whereas the prohibition of opiates was strengthened even further with the 1988 Convention, in which it was recommended that the parties criminalize offences committed upstream and downstream from use and trafficking offences (upstream: manufacturing of drug precursors; downstream: drug money laundering), attack not only supply but also demand and, for this purpose, increase the powers of law enforcement agencies. It will be remembered that Canada’s Parliament passed the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act in 1996 in order to align Canada’s drug legislation with this Convention.

In addition, although they have signed the conventions, certain countries such as Spain, Italy, the Netherlands and a number of German provinces have opted out of a number of restrictive clauses for reasons related to their constitutional obligations. The international conventions are thus less binding than the Canadian delegates who represent us claim.

Recent Expert Opinion

I now come to the most recent opinions of experts whom legislators have consulted on the issue of psychotropic substances. The facts alleged by them invalidate most assumptions on which recent drug laws are based.

The Roques Report concludes that cannabis is not toxic and is completely different from alcohol, cocaine, ecstasy, psychostimulants and certain medications used by drug addicts. In high doses, it induces memory loss, shortened attention span and somnolence, but fewer than 10% of casual users become regular users. In addition, according to the report, "fewer than 10% of excessive users become dependent", which is not negligible, but much less than the risk incurred by excessive alcohol and tobacco users.

The Riley Report comes to conclusions similar to those cited above on cannabis and concludes that there is a certain degree of de facto criminalization of this substance in Canada. Police and court practices make this possible, whereas Parliaments maintain prohibition under the law in order to appear as implacable enemies of crime. Without providing specific recommendations, the author examines alternatives to prohibition, ranging from the elimination of prison terms for drug possession (as previously recommended by LeDain) to legalization/regulation. Ms. Riley feels that the latter avenue is too avant-garde and tends instead toward the policy recommended by the National Task Force on Drug Policy that cannabis possession be made a civil offence under the Contraventions Act, a measure that could apply to possession of other drugs (?) and which, however, I feel is less consistent with the recommendation made by LeDain in 1972 and 1973.

Failing Coherent Action by Legislators: Popular Initiatives, Referenda, Judicial Decisions and "Harm Reduction"

Since, with the exception of the Netherlands, national legislators have not had the courage to make their drug legislation consistent with common sense, social facts and scientific knowledge, the public has demanded and provoked changes in drug laws, and judges, locally-elected representatives and health professionals and social workers have helped reduce the number of prison terms for offenders and ensured decent treatment for drug users and addicts.

1. In Italy, the people, by referendum, brought about the decriminalization of the use and possession of all drugs in 1993 and liberalization of the use of opiates in drug addiction treatment.

2. In Spain in 1983, interpreters of the Constitution found that the offences of drug use and consumption were contrary to the new Criminal Code passed in the wake of the constitutional revision conducted when the democratic system was introduced. An organization of judges in that same country is now on its third attempt to have Spain’s drug laws amended. In Germany, the Federal Constitutional Court has been called upon several times to determine whether countries’ drug laws are constitutional and, in particular, to rule on the severity of penalties in cannabis cases and, more generally, on the constitutionality of the offence of drug use and possession. In 1994, the Court held that it was not legitimate to prosecute for possession of small quantities of cannabis. In Canada, the very light sentence handed down by Judge McCart in a cannabis growing case (Clay, April 1997) is testimony to the disproportionate nature of the penalties provided for in the Criminal Code in such instances. The judgment in the Parker case also underscores the contradictions of Parliament which, on the one hand, recognizes the therapeutic value of cannabis and the right to use it in certain cases, but, to all intents and purposes, makes the substance inaccessible, and ruled in the appellant’s favour (July 2000).

3. Since 1990, the mayors of a number of large cities have tried to correct the excesses of criminal and medical legislation through ad hoc measures. Several in Europe and the United States have signed the Frankfurt Resolution (1990-1995) thus undertaking to encourage the establishment of health resources for drug addicts, provide safe places where intravenous drug users can use drugs and bring about de facto if not de jure decriminalization of the possession and use of soft drugs.

4. In fact, since 1990, it is health and social service workers who have most often pressed municipal governments and health administrations to commit to the harm reduction movement, demanding additional services in hospital emergency wards for intoxication cases and maintenance treatments for drug addicts using substitute drugs or even preferred drugs for those addicts who cannot forego opiates.

In the meantime, members of national parliaments have been deaf and blind to what is actually happening in society, to the reports of experts and their own advisers and to popular pressures (except in Italy), being more concerned, according to Diane Riley, with their image as guardians of the peace and with winning another term than with the general interests of their countries. It is true that reelection can be inconsistent with the need to educate and convince voters of the importance of seeing beyond their personal interests on sensitive and complex matters such as the drug issue and that, in a country of Canada’s size, values and aspirations differ from east to west. In these conditions, working to develop decent, coherent and legitimate national legislation comes second to some MPs’ desire for reelection and calls for courage on their part.

Current Situation

Is the climate in Canada now more favourable to a drug policy consistent with scientific information, the social reality of several million users and the problems caused by drug laws? Recent surveys and Court judgments in Canada, Spain, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and even France suggest this is in fact the case.

As to the way parliaments are prepared to receive the findings of their experts over the next three years, the reactions of France’s National Assembly to the Roques Report, if it is put before that body, and of Britain’s Parliament to the Walton Report will be invaluable indicators for Canada’s Senate Committee, which must table its own report in three years.

The strategy that your committee has promised to develop will have to respond to what many call the "drug problem". But what problem is that?

What Problem Are We Talking About?

The vast majority of persons who use illegal drugs for recreational purposes and exchange drugs with friends or acquaintances pose no problem either for themselves or others. In any case, they definitely do not constitute a "social problem" that the country’s authorities must take into consideration. There remain 5% to 10% of users who come to the attention of public authorities either because they violate drug laws or because their drug use causes them health problems. Regular drug users, that is to say 90% to 95% of individuals who use illegal drugs, are not drug addicts and never have dealings with the courts or correctional services.

Since my area of competence is the population of persons who are criminalized or who risk becoming criminalized, I will therefore say a word about the drug "problem" as it manifests itself at the criminal level. What is the "size" of this "problem" and how serious is it?

1. Number and Nature of Offences

Figure 1

1. Over the past 20 years, offences under drug laws have represented 2% to 4% of criminal offences recorded in Canada. The figure declined from 1977 (4%) to 1992 (less than 2%) and has recently risen to 2.6%.

Figure 2

2. In absolute terms, the number of drug offences varied between 60,000 and 70,000 a year from 1977 to 1998, whereas the total number of offences ranged from 160,000 to 260,000 annually.

Figure 3

The vast majority of drug offences involve cannabis (from 85% in 1977 to 65% recently), followed at a great distance by offences involving cocaine and those involving other drugs (hallucinogenics) and lastly by heroin offences, which represent a very small percentage of the total.

Figure 4

Possession cases, which alone represented 80% of all drug offences 25 years ago, still amount to more than 60%.

Figure 5

Cases involving simple possession of cannabis, which represented nearly 80% of all drug cases in Canada in 1976, still form 50% of all offences committed under drug legislation in recent years.

Thus, even today, 50% of drug-related police activity concerns cases of simple possession of cannabis.

2. Variations in Law Enforcement, by Province

Policing and court practices vary considerably across the country. In British Columbia, the enforcement rate (number of cases recorded by police) under drug legislation is 429.4/100,000, whereas the figure is 151 in Quebec and 218 in Ontario. The number of cases that are prosecuted also differs greatly from province to province, even though the same substances and offences are involved. The rate is much higher in Quebec than in Ontario, but lower in British Columbia than in Quebec (Dion, 2000).

3. Confusion Caused by an Unenforceable Policy

A recent qualitative study of members of the Montreal Urban Community Police Department (Carrier, 2000) underscores the ambivalence and confusion of frontline police officers and their varied reactions to the "drug problem". The extent of the problem is perceived quite differently depending on the officers in question and the neighbourhoods they patrol. In the minds of some, particularly in the case of young drug users and "exchangers", although "the law is the law" and must undoubtedly be enforced, drug possession and use do not really concern the police. The prohibition is simply not enforceable. It is impossible to determine cases of possession in the absence of search and seizure powers, except "on a hunch" or in arresting suspects for other "crimes". Once possession cases and drug deals in public places are discovered either by accident or in the course of investigating other offences, police officers react in various ways depending on their professional aspirations. Those seeking promotion and specialization (who want to join the drug or victimless crimes squads) pass the information along to the appropriate divisions. Patrolmen who intend to remain patrolmen close their eyes or question suspects to obtain trafficking information in exchange for promises of immunity, or else take substance abusers to treatment services, call the parents of minors, etc.

4. Public confusion

The coexistence of a harm reduction practice with a policy of prohibition is a source of considerable moral and mental confusion for the general public. The former counters the effects of criminal policy as well as drug abuse and addiction. Prohibition forces drug use underground and creates a market in which the content and quality of drugs are unknown. The harm reduction policy is a policy for reducing the risks of drug use in a context of prohibition. A government that, on the one hand, maintains a prohibition policy is compelled, on the other, to pay to correct its effects. It is high time this inconsistency was corrected.

Conclusion

Your committee has a number of advantages over previous commissions and committees. First of all, although you are legislators, you are not elected. Second, your work comes at a propitious time in the history of drug policy when scientific knowledge about drugs and the experience of 30 years of criminal policies are difficult to disregard. Third, the convergence of similar initiatives taken at the same time in other countries lends weight to your efforts. Fourth, the fact that judicial bodies are reluctant to apply Canadian drug legislation and are calling upon Parliament to assume its responsibilities stands in your favour, but you must act quickly if you do not want judicial review to overtake the legislative function. Lastly, recent surveys attest to the fact that the public is ready to reconsider, if not all legislation on psychotropic substances, at least certain aspects.

Your task is an important one and it is urgent that you speak out. The practice of harm reduction must not serve as an alternative to genuine legislative reform. By failing to change the legal-criminal framework, we become accomplices in a detestable strategy.

Marie-Andrée Bertrand September 10, 2000

Bibliography

Official documents

Australia, Royal Commission into the Non Medical use of Drugs, Cannabis. A Report. Canberra, 1979

Canada, Loi réglementant certaines drogues et autres substances. L.C. 1996, ch.19

Canada, Commission canadienne d’enquête sur l’usage des drogues à des fins non médical (LeDain).

Rapport provisoire, 1970;

Le cannabis, 1972;

Le traitement 1972;

Rapport final 1973.

Ottawa, Information Canada.

England, Advisory Committee on Drug Dependance, Report. London, The Queen’s Printer, 1968.

England, Advisory Committe on Drug Dependance, The Wooton Report on Cannabis 1969. London, The Queen’s Printer, 1970.

France, OFDT. Drogues et toxicomanies. Indicateurs et tendances, 1999.

France, Commission interministérielle de lutte contre la drogue et la la toxicomanie , Problèmes posés par la dangérosité des « drogues ». Rapport du Professeure Bernard Roques au Secrétaire d’État à la Santé. Mai 1998.

Nations Unies, Conférence des Nations Unies pour l’adoption d’une Convention contre le trafic illicite des stupéfiants et des substances psychotropes, Vienne, 25 novembre au 20 décembre 1988. Documents officiels, volume II. New York, Nations Unies, 1994.

Nations Unies, Dictionnaire multilingue des stupéfiants et des substances psychotropes placés sous contrôle international, New York, Nations Unies, 1983.

Nations Unies, Commentaires sur la Convention sur les substances psychotropes faite à Vienne le 21 février 1971. New York, Nations Unies, 1978.

Nations Unies, Commentaire sur le protocole portant amendement de la Convention unique sur les stupéfiants fait à Genève le 25 mars 1972. New York, Nations Unies, 1977.

Nations Unies, Commentaire sur le Convention unique sur les stupéfiants de 1961 préparés par le Secrétaire général conformément au par. 1 du dispositif de la résolution 914 D (XXXIV) du Conseil économique et social en date du 3 août 1962. New York, Nations Unies, 1975.

Nations Unies, Convention unique sur les stupéfiants de 1961 y compris les tableaux, l’acte final, les résolutions, tels qu’ils ont été approuvés par la Conférence des Nations Unies pour l’adoption d’une Convention unique sur les stupéfiants. New York, Nations Unies, 1965.

Pays Bas, Groupe de travail sur les stupéfiants. Condition des drogues et dangers de la drogue. La Haye, Gouvernement des Pays-Bas, 1973.

United States, National Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse, Shafer Commission Drug Use in America : Problem in Perspective. Washington D.C », U.S. Government Printing, 1973.

Scientific publications

Albrecht, H.J., Les recherches sur les drogues en Europe. Dans Les Drogues en France, politiques, marchés, usages. C. Faugeron, directrice d’édition. Genève, Georg éditeur, 1999, 3-23.

Albrecht, H.J., Politiques (criminelles) et problèmes de drogues : évolution et tendances en République Fédérale d’Allemagne. Déviance et Société, 1998, 22, 1, 77-88.

Aubusson de Cavarlay, B., Du Dossier de procédure aux filières pénales : l’effet d’entonnoir et le syndrome du réverbère. Les Drogues en France. Politiques, marchés, usages. C. Faugeron, directrice d’édition. Genève, Georg éditeur, 1999, 151-159.

Barré, M.D., Les Liaisons statistiques entre infractions à la législation sur les stupéfiants et délinquance. Les Drogues en France, Politiques, marchés, usages. C. Faugeron, directrice d’édition, Genève, Georg éditeur, 1999, 117-128.

Bertrand, M.A., Le droit de la drogue comme instrument de mondialisation. In : Globalization and Legal Cultures. Onati Summer Course 1997, J. Feest editor, Onati Paper no 7, Onati, Spain, International Institute for the Scoiology of Law, 1999, 113-137.

Bertrand, M.A., Réflexions sur la décriminalisation de l’intervention. In : Europa, ta jeunesse t’interpelle. Journées de formation et d’études de l’ANPASE à Aix-Les-Bains, 14-17 octobre 1997. Canteleu, ANPASE, 1998, 125-156.

Bertrand, M.A. La situation des drogues en Amérique du Nord. In Drogues et Droits de l’homme. F. Caballero, directeur d’édition, Paris, Les empêcheurs de danser en rond, 1992, 11-129.

Bertrand, M.A., Résurgence du mouvement antiprohibitionniste. Criminologie, 1989, 22, 1, 121-133.

Bertrand, M.A., Permanence des effets pervers et résistance au changement des lois sur les drogues. Déviance et Société, 1986, 10, 8, 177-191.

Cagliero, S. et Lagrange, H. parcours vers l’hroïne d’une cohorte d’usagers de drogues des années 1990. In : Les Drogues en France, Politiques, marchés usages. C. Faugeron, directrice d’édition, Genève, Georg éditeur, 1999, 160-168.

Cesoni, M.L. Usages de stupéfiants : les variations de la politique criminelle italienne. Déviance et Société, 1999, 23, 2, 221, 232.

Cesoni, M.L., La politique suisse de la drogue : un modèle pour l’Union européenne? In : Les Drogues en France, Politiques, marchés usages. C. Faugeron, directrice d’édition. Genève, Georg, 1999, 99-109.

Caiata, M., La consommationn contrôée de drogues dures. Psychotropes, 1996, 12, 2, 6-24.

Dudouet, F.X. La formation du contrôle international des drogues. Déviance et Société, 1999, 23, 4, 395-419.

Eissner, A. Déterminants de la politique suisse en matière de drogues. L’exemple du programme de prescription d’héroïne. Déviance et Société, 1999, 23, 2, 189-204.

Erickson, P.G., Riley, D., Cheung, Y.W., O’Hare, P.A., Harm Reduction. A New Direction for Drug Policies and Programs. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1997.

E.rickson, P.G., A persistent paradox : Drug law and policy in Canada. Canadian Journal of Criminology, April 1999, 275-284.

Erickson, P.G., Recent Trends in Canadian Drug Policy : The Decline and Resurgence of Prohibitionism. Daedalus, 1992, 121, 3, 139-167.

Faugeron, C., directrice d’édition, Les Drogues en France, Politiques, marchés, usages. Genève, Georg éditeur, 1999, 289p.

Giffen, P.J., Endicott, S., Lambert, S., Panics and Indifference; The Politics of Canada’s Drug Laws. Ottawa, Canadian Centre on Substance Abuse, 1991.

Huslman L. et van Ransbeek, H., Évaluation critique de la politique des drogues. Déviance et Société, 1983, 7, 3, 271-280.

Kaminski, D. et P. Mary, Politiques (criminelles) en matière de drogues : évolution et tendances en Belgique. Déviance et Société, 1999, 23, 2 205=220.

Riley, D. La politique canadienne de contrôle des drogues. Aperçus et commentaires. Novembre 1988.

Forthcoming

Bertrand, M.A., La politique des drogues, contestations, paradoxes et confusion. Psychotropes, automne 2000.

Carrier, Nicolas, Discours des patrouilleurs montréalais sur la détection de l’infraction de possession de drogues prohibées. Psychotropes, automne 2000.

Dion, Guy A., Législation nationale et disparités régionales : le cas du Canada. Psychotropes, automne 2000.

Figure 1

Changes in the number of drug offences as a percentage of total Criminal Code

offences recorded by police officers, Canada, 1977 to 1998 inclusive

[Illegible]

Source: Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics (Cat. 85-205XPE) Data compiled by Nicolas Carrier © 2000

Figure 2

Changes in the number of offences under the Criminal Code and drug legislation

registered by police officers, Canada, 1997 to 1998 inclusive

[Illegible]

Source: Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics (Cat. 85-205XPE) Data compiled by Nicolas Carrier © 2000

FIGURE 3

Offences under drug legislation reported by control agencies,

by substance, Canada, 1974-1998

Cannabis - Cocaine - Other drugs - Heroin

Guy A. Dion, 2000

FIGURE 4

Offences under drug legislation reported by

control agencies (%), by type of offence,

Canada, 1977-1998

Possession - Trafficking - Importing - Cultivation

Guy A. Dion, 2000

FIGURE 5

Cannabis possession offences reported by control agencies

as a percentage of total offences under

drug legislation, Canada, 1977-1998